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The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian 
Presidents: Constitutional Interpretation in a 
Broken Constitutional Order* 
Sanford Levinson** and Mark A. Graber***  
INTRODUCTION 
Herbert Wechsler’s On Neutral Principles in Constitutional 
Law is one of the most widely cited1 and reviled essays in the legal 
literature. After declaring that judicial decisions “must be genuinely 
principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in 
reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the 
immediate result that is achieved,”2 Wechsler insisted that the most 
canonical of all twentieth century cases, Brown v. Board of 
Education, did not meet this standard.3 Wechsler first maintained 
that justices applying neutral principles would treat segregated 
schools as raising “freedom of association” issues.4 He then 
professed to be unable to discern a proper neutral principle that 
would constitutionally justify a judicial decision forcing whites who 
did not wish to associate with African-Americans to attend the 
same public schools as students of color.5 Wechsler was correctly 
chastised for what many, most notably Charles Black, 
demonstrated was a stunning obtuseness to the realities of 
American history and the role that sheer racism played (and, 
 
 * We are grateful to the editors of the Chapman Law Review and to Dean Tom 
Campbell for encouraging us to collect our thoughts on this matter. We have also 
benefitted from the responses of Aziz Huq, Keith Whittington, and Kenneth Kersch, not to 
mention many conversations with colleagues and co-participants at conferences in 
Madison, Wisconsin, and New Orleans. 
 ** W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, 
University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin. 
 *** Regents Professor, University of Maryland Carey School of Law. 
 1 Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All 
Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2012). 
 2 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 15 (1959). 
 3 Id. at 22; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 4 Wechsler, supra note 2, at 34. 
 5 Id.  
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for that matter, continues to play) in allocating the burdens and 
benefits of life in the United States.6 To accept Wechsler’s notion 
that constitutional law should in essence ignore self-conscious 
and public Southern-white efforts to establish racial apartheid, 
whatever might be thought to be constitutional commands to the 
contrary, is akin to writing a guide to normal everyday life for 
Londoners in 1941 that ignored the Battle of Britain.  
Wechsler’s analysis of Brown has been confined to the 
dustbin of history, but his claim that constitutional decision 
makers should abstract constitutional law problems from their 
underlying constitutional politics is alive and well in the legal 
literature on executive power in the age of Donald Trump. 
Experts and pundits commonly claim that President Trump is 
constitutionally entitled to exercise the same constitutional 
authority as has been historically exercised by other presidents. 
Journalists and constitutional analysts insist that courts should 
engage in “business as usual” when evaluating President Donald 
Trump’s exercise of executive power. The Washington Post gave 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals a scolding when the judges 
quoted Trump’s bigoted remarks on the campaign trail as 
reasons for finding unconstitutional a federal order severely 
limiting immigration from seven Muslim-majority countries.7 
The Post’s editorial quite correctly declared that in the past, 
“Presidents have enjoyed, and deserve, broad leeway when it 
comes to setting immigration limits.”8 Lest one dismiss the Post 
writers as lacking in the requisite legal training, leading 
constitutional experts on prominent blogs, at least some of whom 
acknowledge that President Trump is woefully unqualified for 
office, nonetheless agree with the Post that courts should declare 
unconstitutional executive orders issued by the Trump 
Administration only if that tribunal would strike down an 
identical order issued by a more competent president for the 
same reasons. Josh Blackman claims that “[t]he judiciary should 
 
 6 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 
421, 427–29, 427 n.19 (1960). 
 7 Editorial Board, Mr. Trump’s travel ban is offensive and imprudent. But is it really 
unconstitutional?, WASH. POST (May 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/mr-trumps-travel-ban-is-offensive-and-imprudent-but-is-it-really-unconstitutional/ 
2017/05/28/901947d0-41aa-11e7-8c25-44d09ff5a4a8_story.html?utm_term=.2952d4c6ebd8 
[http://perma.cc/2RGA-U6EY]. 
 8 Id. (emphasis added). 
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not abandon its traditional role simply because the president has 
abandoned his.”9 
When judges treat this president as anything other than normal, it 
sends a signal to the public that the chief executive is not as 
legitimate as his predecessors. . . . Trump was elected through the 
same constitutional process by which judges received their lifetime 
commissions. He should be treated as such.10 
Defense department experts have informed Congress that 
President Trump has the same power to begin a nuclear war as 
any other president. “If we were to change the decision-making 
process because of a distrust of this president,” former 
undersecretary for policy at the Defense Department Brian 
McKeon asserted, “that would be an unfortunate decision for the 
next president.”11 
This claim that all presidents enjoy the same Article II 
prerogatives was an implicit staple of the literature on executive 
power published prior to the 2016 election. Consider a brilliant 
article, The President’s Enforcement Power, published in 2013 by 
University of Michigan professor of law Kate Andrias.12 Her 
subject, the discretion a president has to determine the actual 
enforcement of the law, could hardly be a more important topic in 
light of President Obama’s bitterly contested order that many 
undocumented aliens be freed from the potential burden of 
deportation if they present no genuine threat to the United 
States,13 or Attorney General Eric Holder’s decision not to enforce 
clearly valid federal drug laws14 against various Coloradans who 
 
 9 Josh Blackman, Why Courts Shouldn’t Try to Read Trump’s Mind, POLITCO (Mar. 
16, 2017) (emphasis added), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/why-courts-
shouldnt-try-to-read-trumps-mind-214921 [http://perma.cc/F8GB-PYB4]. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Karoun Demirjian, Trump’s nuclear authority divides senators alarmed by his 
‘volatile’ behavior, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/power 
post/senators-deadlock-in-debate-over-whether-to-restrain-trumps-nuclear-launch-authority/ 
2017/11/14/491a994a-c95b-11e7-8321-481fd63f174d_story.html?utm_term=.15b6498a5436 
[http://perma.cc/Z6E5-NW3C]. 
 12 See generally Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1031 (2013). 
 13 See Janet Napolitano, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to 
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children, U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial- 
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. But see Texas v. United States, 
809 F.3d 134, 135, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) (enjoining enforcement of the order). 
 14 See Ryan J. Reilly & Ryan Grim, Eric Holder Says DOJ Will Let Washington, 
Colorado Marijuana Laws Go Into Effect, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2013, 1:30 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/29/eric-holder-marijuana-washington-colorado-
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were taking advantage of the legalization of marijuana 
possession and sale in that state. Professor Andrias’ article is 
extremely illuminating in many ways. What is especially striking 
from the perspective of 2017 is the essay’s unrelenting 
abstraction in the tradition of “Neutral Principles.” There are 
allusions to Washington and Obama, among many other 
presidents, but the article is very much, as promised by the title, 
about the constitutional authority of a reified president to 
determine how laws are, or are not, enforced.15 Professor 
Andrias, like other distinguished scholars of executive power,16 
offers interesting proposals to govern the conduct of all possible 
occupants of the White House implementing laws passed by all 
possible Congresses.17 
More fairly, we should write all “conceivable” occupants of 
the Oval Office as of 2013. No one writing about presidential 
power before the 2016 election could genuinely conceive of the 
possibility that Barack Obama would be succeeded by Donald 
Trump or a person equally as unfit for office. Staying within one, 
or even two, standard deviations of the norm is usually sufficient. 
When thinking of presidents, scholars should account for 
Franklin Pierce as well as Franklin Roosevelt, but good reason 
exists for thinking that the differences among the first forty-five 
presidents did not warrant significant variation in their formal 
legal powers. We do not usually require that scholars consider a 
wildly improbable figure, three standard deviations away, as 
would have been the case had Andrias or any other student of 
 
doj_n_3837034.html [http://perma.cc/LR6N-GFTX]. Attorney General Sessions has 
recently announced his decision to reverse the Holder policy. See, e.g., Jon Hill, Sessions 
Reverses Obama-Era Marijuana Enforcement Policy, LAW360 (Jan. 4, 2018, 6:20 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/998871/sessions-reverses-obama-era-marijuana-
enforcement-policy. 
 15 See generally Andrias, supra note 12. 
 16 For a sampling, see David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in 
Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 699 n.20 (2008), citing the most influential pieces of scholarship 
on executive power over the last half century, none of which suggest that the legal power 
of presidents varies by office-holder. Substantial literature exists in political science 
pointing out that presidential capacity to exercise these fixed legal powers varies by 
officeholder and time. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: 
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH (1993); RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM 
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN (The Free Press ed., 1990); JAMES DAVID BARBER, THE 
PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER: PREDICTING PERFORMANCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE (4th ed. 1972). 
 17 Id. at 1078. 
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executive power considered the possibility that a bigoted, 
uninformed, serial liar would assume the powers of the oval 
office. John Hart Ely highlighted this facet of ordinary scholarship 
when his conclusion to his monumental Democracy and Distrust 
explained why his theory of representation reinforcement—and 
the concomitant rejection of the Supreme Court’s aggressively 
enforcing non-textual “fundamental rights”—did not prevent a 
hypothetical Congress from prohibiting the removal of gall 
bladders except when necessary to save the person’s life.18 Ely 
asserted that such a bill “couldn’t pass” in our actual political 
system and “refuse[d] to play the game”19 of constructing a 
constitutional theory concerned with what in context are the 
equivalent of science-fiction hypotheticals dealing with invasions 
by space aliens. 
The flying saucers have landed. Donald J. Trump is now 
President of the United States. We are often informed that 
elections have consequences. What this means, of course, is that 
at least on occasion, the specific identity of those who win 
elections and are empowered to make decisions can have 
significant consequences, for good and for ill. As of January 2018 
when we completed our revisions of this essay, one can discern 
an ever-growing consensus among at least a solid majority of the 
American public and probably at least ninety percent of the 
politically informed public that Trump is manifestly unfit to be 
president. That he is president is the consequence of a severe 
malfunction in the constitutional system for electing presidents, 
whether one assigns the failure to the constitutional text, the 
constitutional culture, or, as is almost certainly the case, both.20 
The question we must now ask is whether this constitutional 
failure is a subject only for political science or whether 
constitutional decision-makers, when interpreting Article II, 
 
 18 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
182–83 (1980). 
 19 Id. at 183. 
 20 Donald Trump’s election was also the consequence of a presidential primary 
system not imagined by those who designed the Constitution. He was immeasurably 
aided by having more than a dozen rivals at the beginning of the process and half a dozen 
until the last few primaries. This enabled him to prevail, especially in first-past-the-post 
states, with considerably less than a majority of the vote. Trump’s failure to obtain a 
plurality of the final national vote made him the first president in history to have lost 
both the majority of his party’s primary vote and the popular vote in the ensuing national 
election. 
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ought to take into account that Americans have elected a chief 
executive manifestly unfit to exercise the longstanding powers of 
the presidency. When Justice Joseph Story in Martin v. Mott 
spoke of “the high qualities which the Executive must be 
presumed to possess, of public virtue, and honest devotion to the 
public interests,”21 was he speaking of a conclusive or a 
rebuttable presumption? 
As readers may already have guessed, we challenge this 
almost unexamined assumption that the constitutional powers of 
the president can be blithely abstracted from the occupant of the 
White House. We insist that constitutional decision makers must 
take into account (assuming they realize) whether they are 
making decisions for a constitutional order functioning within 
normal parameters or, on the contrary, a constitutional order 
reeling from the collapse of crucial assumptions underlying the 
constitutional text and ordinary constitutional practice. We 
maintain that the Article II powers of a president manifestly 
unfit for office are different from the Article II powers of a 
president who has the character and capabilities appropriate for 
exercising those powers. Common sense, The Federalist Papers, 
other interpretive activities, and Brown v. Board of Education 
provide strong reasons for not vesting the anti-Publian president 
with Publian powers. 
Our argument proceeds as follows. We begin by briefly 
elaborating the consensus that Donald Trump lacks the 
constitutional, even if not the “legal,” qualifications to be 
President of the United States. The next section discusses how 
Publius in The Federalist Papers closely yoked presidential 
powers to the character of the office-holder. We then note how 
such other interpretive exercises as plays, athletics, and contract 
law routinely make adjustments when events undermine the 
assumptions underlying the authoritative text, whether that text 
be instantiated in a script, play, or bargain. American 
constitutional practice, we continue, has been historically far 
more responsive to Publian failures than contemporary claims 
about executive power under President Trump acknowledge. 
Such decisions as Brown v. Board of Education22 and New York 
 
 21 Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 32 (1827). 
 22 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Times Co. v. Sullivan23 are far better explained as judicial 
responses to constitutional frauds perpetrated by the Jim Crow 
South than the more abstracted reasons given by the justices in 
their opinions. Brown, in fact, provides a model for thinking 
about limiting the power of an anti-Publian president. Such 
judicial strategies include focusing on actual motives for 
executive action, taking rationality standards seriously, and 
limiting, wherever possible, official powers when the officeholder 
or officeholders demonstrate that they are incapable of using or 
unwilling to use those powers responsibly or consistently with 
established constitutional norms.  
Given our ostensible 5000-word limit, very generously 
interpreted to mean 5000 words per author, our essay is 
necessarily provocative. We hope to initiate an important—and 
overdue—conversation rather than provide anything in the way 
of definitive answers (even assuming such things exist with 
regard to complex legal and political dilemmas). Both of us 
believe the American constitutional order is broken, even as we 
dispute the nature of the malady and the remedy.24 We also 
agree that the remedy for a broken constitutional order is not 
constitutional interpretation as usual. Doing so, we think, is 
analogous to telling a quarterback to throw a long pass because 
that was the called-for play, even though the receiver has fallen 
down. At the very least, we hope to convince readers that 
the Constitution of the United States might not be 
officeholder-indifferent, and that constitutional politics as usual 
is not the remedy for the Trump presidency or, for that matter, 
the severe crisis of American constitutional democracy. The 
pages below provide one, but hardly the exclusive, path for 
constitutional decision makers and American citizens to begin 
thinking about presidential power in light of the actual 
officeholder and, more generally, to think about constitutional 
practice in a time of severe constitutional failure. 
 
 23 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 24 See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS 
OF GOVERNANCE (2012) (arguing the American constitutional order is broken); Mark A. 
Graber, Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary Thoughts on Identifying and Mending a 
Dysfunction Constitutional Order, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611, 617–18 (2014). 
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I. DONALD TRUMP AS THE ANTI-PUBLIAN PRESIDENT 
President Donald Trump lacks every constitutional 
qualification for office save that he was elected consistently with 
the rules set out in Article II of the Constitution of the United 
States, including, obviously, the Electoral College. Trump is 
known to be proudly ignorant, uninterested in constitutional 
limits on his power, a probable sex offender, a likely associate of 
Russian mobsters eager to launder their money by lending to 
someone who cannot procure loans from almost any leading 
American bank given his demonstrated record in refusing to 
honor his debts,25 a bully, and a bigot who professes to see no real 
difference between George Washington and Robert E. Lee. 
James Clapper, the former Director of National Intelligence, 
told CNN following an August 2017 Trump campaign rally in 
Phoenix, Arizona that he “really question[s] [Trump’s] ability to 
be—his fitness to be—in this office.”26 After labeling Trump’s 
remarks and demeanor “downright scary and disturbing,”27 
Clapper, who served in the Clinton, Bush II, and Obama 
Administrations, denounced Trump’s “behavior and divisiveness 
and complete intellectual, moral and ethical void,”28 describing 
his presidency as “this nightmare[.]”29 Clapper was particularly 
disturbed about presidential access to, and power to put into 
operation, America’s nuclear codes. “In a fit of pique he decides to 
do something about Kim Jong Un, there’s actually very little to 
stop him,” Clapper said. “The whole system is built to ensure 
rapid response if necessary. So there’s very little in the way 
of controls over exercising a nuclear option, which is pretty 
damn scary.”30 
That most Democrats or political liberals might readily agree 
with Clapper is hardly surprising. What is remarkable, though, 
is the extent to which Donald Trump’s gross unfitness for office 
 
 25 We cannot, of course, supply sufficient proof of this assertion because of his 
resolute refusal to release any of his tax returns that might well indicate significant 
interaction with Russian moguls. 
 26 Leinz Vales, James Clapper calls Trump speech ‘downright scary and disturbing’, 
CNN (Aug. 24, 2017, 5:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/23/politics/james-clapper-
trump-phoenix-rally-don-lemon-cnntv/index.html [http://perma.cc/9KL7-WPD8]. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
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has become the conventional wisdom among conservative 
commentators. Washington Post columnist Michael Gerson, who 
loyally served George W. Bush as a speechwriter and a conduit to 
the Christian community, describes Trump as “willfully blind to 
history” with “a shriveled emptiness where [his] soul once 
resided.”31 Gerson is not alone among conservatives in his 
contempt for Trump. George Will, who re-registered as an 
independent after Trump’s nomination, observed that Trump has 
“an untrained mind bereft of information and married to 
stratospheric self-confidence.”32 Jack Goldsmith, a lawyer who 
headed the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush II administration, 
describes Trump as a “President of the United States who does 
not at all grasp the Office he occupies, and who thus entirely 
lacks the proper situation sense, or contextual knowledge, in 
which a President should exercise judgment or act.”33 Benjamin 
Wittes, the editor of Lawfare who is associated with both the 
Brookings Institution and the Hoover Institution, declared that 
Trump “does not enter office with a presumption that as 
President he will pursue a vision of what national security 
means . . . or that he will do so in a rational fashion[.]”34 “What 
does it even mean,” he asked, “for a person who contradicts 
himself constantly, who says all kinds of crazy things, who has 
unknown but extensive financial dealings that could be affected 
by his actions, and who makes up facts as needed in the moment 
to swear an oath to faithfully execute the office?”35 Peter Wehner, 
who served Republican Presidents Reagan, George H. W. Bush, 
and George W. Bush, recently referred, approvingly, to “a 
Republican member of Congress [he] spoke with [who] called the 
 
 31 Michael Gerson, There is a shriveled emptiness where Trump’s soul once resided, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/there-is-a-shriveled- 
emptiness-where-trumps-soul-once-resided/2017/08/17/bb9edd22-8370-11e7-b359-15a3617 
c767b_story.html?utm_term=.aaa9527e2dd8 [http://perma.cc/BN78-B936]. 
 32 George F. Will, Trump has a dangerous disability, WASH. POST (May 3, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-has-a-dangerous-disability/2017/ 
05/03/56ca6118-2f6b-11e7-9534-00e4656c22aa_story.html?utm_term=.43785bf8d842 
[http://perma.cc/ZQE4-LQW6]. 
 33 Jack Goldsmith, Two Reflections on the Comey Statement, LAWFARE 
(June 7, 2017, 8:56 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/two-reflections-comey-statement 
[http://perma.cc/Z2WA-NEJQ]. 
 34 Benjamin Wittes & Quinta Jurecic, What Happens When We Don’t Believe the 
President’s Oath, LAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-
happens-when-we-dont-believe-presidents-oath [http://perma.cc/YZ8T-F9FH]. 
 35 Id. 
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president a ‘child king,’ and a ‘self-pitying fool.’”36 Continued 
hopes that Trump as president will prove significantly different 
from what he had revealed about himself during the campaign 
are naïve. Doyle McManus of the Los Angeles Times notes that 
“[l]ast November, 63 million voters gave Trump a chance to grow 
into the office he won . . . Instead, he seems intent on proving 
that he’s either unable or unwilling to grow.”37 Daniel Drezner 
answers the question, “Can Donald Trump Grow up in office?” by 
responding, “toddlers are gonna toddler.”38 
The above sources are all prior to September 2017, when this 
essay was initially drafted and submitted to the editors of the 
Chapman Law Review. The ensuing months have provided an 
abundance of additional sources. Consider an October 26, 2017 
column by Mr. Gerson praising Republican senators John 
McCain and Bob Corker for their criticisms of Donald Trump. 
McCain and Corker pointed to the undoubted truth that 
“Americans have elected a president who is dangerously 
unstable, divisive, childish, nasty, deceptive, self-deluded, 
morally unfit, deeply unconservative and thus badly wrong on 
some of the largest issues of our time.”39 Arizona Senator Jeff 
Flake, who recently denounced Trump—and, by implication, the 
contemporary Republican Party—while announcing his own 
decision to retire from the Senate rather than face almost certain 
defeat in the Republican primary, describes the 
[M]oral vandalism that has been set loose in our culture, as well as 
the seeming disregard for the institutions of American democracy. The 
damage to our democracy seems to come daily now, most recently with 
the president’s venting late last week that if he had his way, he 
would hijack the American justice system to conduct political 
prosecutions—a practice that happens only in the very worst places on 
 
 36 Peter Wehner, Behold Our ‘Child King,’ N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/opinion/sunday/trump-our-child-king.html?ref= 
opinion&_r=0.  
 37 Doyle McManus, Another day, another vulgar Trump tweet. The president clearly 
isn’t learning on the job., L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2017, 9:45 AM), http://www.latimes. 
com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mcmanus-trump-tweet-mike-20170629-story.html 
[http://perma.cc/CV7H-TSZV]. 
 38 Daniel W. Drezner, Can Donald Trump grow up in office?, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/03/can-donald-trump-grow-
up-in-office/?utm_term=.bb6933cad2bb [http://perma.cc/3C4S-RFZ2]. 
 39 Michael Gerson, God bless all the anti-Trump Republicans, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/god-bless-all-the-anti-trump-republicans/ 
2017/10/26/14f45b9a-ba80-11e7-be94-fabb0f1e9ffb_story.html?utm_term=. c452e623f3db 
[http://perma.cc/GGR9-RHC7]. 
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earth. And as this behavior continues, it is not just our politics being 
disfigured, but the American sense of well-being and time-honored 
notions of the common good.40 
Michael Wolff’s Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House 
dominated the news in early January 2018. Wolff quoted 
numerous White House insiders who referred to the President as 
an “idiot” or the equivalent of a “child” with an insatiable need for 
loyalty and approval. These observations, the above paragraphs 
demonstrate, are neither new nor surprising. What may be most 
striking is Wolff’s conclusion to an article he published in The 
Hollywood Reporter, which maintained Trump may be exhibiting 
signs of dementia. “Hoping for the best,” Wolff wrote: 
[W]ith their personal futures as well as the country’s future depending 
on it, my indelible impression of talking to [Trump’s associations in 
the White House] and observing them through much of the first year 
of his presidency . . . came to believe he was incapable of functioning 
in his job. 
At Mar-a-Lago, just before the new year, a heavily made-up Trump 
failed to recognize a succession of old friends.41 
That Donald Trump is no George Washington is of less 
constitutional concern to contemporary Americans than to the 
framers. Publius imagined presidents in the image of 
Washington, who rise above the partisan strife of their day. Such 
characters were recognized as being “pre-eminent for ability and 
virtue”42 across the political spectrum. The two-party system that 
developed almost immediately after the Constitution was ratified 
(and which developed in part because of the structure of 
presidential elections)43 obviated the possibility of a universally 
esteemed president. Partisan presidents in a Publian system can 
at best lay claim to having the qualifications their party believes 
necessary to be a successful president. Parties have nevertheless 
remained within what might be called a “zone of acceptability” 
 
 40 Jeff Flake, In a Democracy, There Can Be No Bystanders, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/opinion/jeff-flake-speech-letters-democracy.html.  
 41 Michael Wolff, “You Can’t Make this S--- Up”: My Year Inside Trump’s Insane 
White House, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jan. 4, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.hollywood 
reporter.com/news/michael-wolff-my-insane-year-inside-trumps-white-house-1071504 
[http://perma.cc/YJ6M-ME7T]; MICHAEL WOLFF, FIRE AND FURY: INSIDE THE TRUMP 
WHITE HOUSE (2018). 
 42 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 43 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, 
MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005). 
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with regard to the candidates they present for the White House, 
with presidential nominees perhaps deficient in one qualification 
possessing other prerequisites for the oval office. 
Even within this context, Donald Trump appears to be no 
Rutherford B. Hayes, James Earl Carter, or even Warren G. 
Harding who, unlike the vindictive Woodrow Wilson, pardoned 
Eugene Debs and even invited him to visit Harding at the White 
House (which Debs did).44 These less distinguished presidents 
were thought competent to hold office by a substantial segment of 
their party, including, crucially, experienced political leaders and 
office-holders, even as members of the rival party and rival 
factions of their party frequently jeered at their qualifications. 
Moreover, commentators often exaggerate formal qualifications. 
The most formally qualified presidents in our history, in terms of 
the multiplicity of offices they occupied before moving to the 
White House, were John Quincy Adams, James Buchanan, and 
George H. W. Bush. Abraham Lincoln was among the least 
qualified. Barack Obama scarcely teemed with obvious 
qualifications for the office he sought. (His predecessor, George 
W. Bush, had at least been governor for six years of a major 
state.) What makes Donald Trump historically unique is his lack 
of any serious qualification for public office and the ever-growing 
consensus among informed members of his party that he is, in 
addition, a menace to American constitutional institutions. 
Republican members of Congress, unaware that their microphones 
are on, have been caught describing Trump as “crazy” and have 
not retracted such comments.45 Tennessee Republican Senator 
Bob Corker stated on the record that “[t]he president has not yet 
been able to demonstrate the stability, nor some of the 
competence, that he needs to demonstrate in order to be 
successful.”46 Texas Senator Ted Cruz, when speaking of Trump 
prior to his nomination, stated: “This man is a pathological liar” 
 
 44 Peter Richardson, ‘Democracy’s Prisoner: Eugene V. Debs, the Great War, and the 
Right to Dissent’ by Ernest Freeberg, L.A. TIMES (June 15, 2008), http://www.latimes. 
com/style/la-bk-richardson15-2008jun15-story.html [http://perma.cc/44EB-UTNP]. 
 45 Philip Bump, Senators on hot mic: Trump is ‘crazy,’ ‘I’m worried,’ WASH. POST 
(July 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/07/25/senators-on-hot-
mic-trump-is-crazy-im-worried/?utm_term=.3c36f79061e6 [http://perma.cc/X6MJ-6XKD]. 
 46 Richard Cowan, Republican senator says Trump yet to demonstrate needed 
stability, REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-corker/ 
republican-senator-says-trump-yet-to-demonstrate-needed-stability-idUSKCN1AX2DW 
[http://perma.cc/KB95-FWSW]. 
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who “doesn’t know the difference between truth and lies.”47 Many 
congressional Republicans, of course, have remained relatively 
silent, but as Sherlock Holmes noted long ago, dogs that do not 
bark in the night can provide central clues. In this case, what is 
striking is the nearly complete absence of Republican office-
holders who are willing to counter Senator Corker, Senator Cruz, 
Senator Flake, leading conservative columnists, and Admiral 
Clapper by praising Trump’s capacity for sober judgment and 
ability to be an adroit Commander-in-Chief.48  
II. PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER AND PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 
So what, one might ask. Shouldn’t constitutional decision 
makers—most importantly inhabitants of judicial office, but also 
academics who play a vital role in socializing young would-be 
lawyers—be committed to upholding universal and neutral 
constitutional norms? Shouldn’t they suppress their “private” 
(and therefore legally irrelevant) reluctance to do so and instead 
permit President Trump to exercise the same presidential powers 
as any other occupant of the Oval Office?49 Article II is facially 
indifferent to the character of the office-holder. The Qualifications 
Clause requires only that the President meet the age requirement, 
be a “natural-born” citizen, and reside within the United States for 
at least fourteen years before taking office.50 Lawyers, doctors, 
 
 47 David Wright et al., Cruz unloads with epic takedown of ‘pathological liar,’ 
‘narcissist’ Donald Trump, CNN (May 3, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/03/politics/ 
donald-trump-rafael-cruz-indiana/index.html [http://perma.cc/Q22F-YSGD]. 
 48 Perhaps the most notable exception is Alabama Senator Lucius Strange, at a time 
when he was desperately (and, it turned out, unsuccessfully) trying to hold on to the seat 
to which he was appointed to succeed now-Attorney General Jeff Sessions. “President 
Trump is the greatest thing that has happened to this country,” Strange has said. “I 
consider it a biblical miracle that he’s there.” Not to be out-Trumped, but as it were, his 
principal (and ultimately successful) opponent in the Republican primary, former state 
Chief Justice Roy Moore proclaimed, “God puts people in positions he wants. I believe he 
sent Donald Trump in there to do what Donald Trump can do.” Ben Jacobs, ‘A biblical 
miracle’: Alabama GOP Senate primary set to test Trump’s reach, THE GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 15, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/15/alabama-
gop-senate-primary-donald-trump-mitch-mcconnell [http://perma.cc/L49R-EB6V]. 
 49 See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
 50 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. Had Ted Cruz been elected, we might have 
considered the “true” meaning of “natural born citizen.” Should a Puerto Rican citizen 
who moved to the mainland when he was thirty decide to run for the presidency ten years 
later, we could mull over whether Puerto Rico, though not a state, is now “within the 
United States.” See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 251 (1901). Chief Justice Fuller, in 
his Downes dissent, asks if “a native-born citizen of Massachusetts [would] be ineligible if 
he had taken up his residence and resided in one of the territories for so many years that 
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other professionals, and many applicants for ordinary, minimum 
wage positions must meet rigorous educational standards and 
less rigorous character tests, but not the President of the United 
States. The text states that “[t]he President shall be Commander 
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,”51 not that 
“the President shall be Commander in Chief, provided that he is 
a mature adult.” The impersonal language of the text seemingly 
compels a court considering the constitutionality of presidential 
decrees that determine who is fit to enter the United States to 
follow the same interpretive practices judges would follow if the 
ban on entry was issued by Barack Obama, George W. Bush, 
Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, or, were they eligible to 
hold the office, St. Francis of Assisi or Adolf Hitler. That the 
president in question is unfit to hold the office is not relevant 
because “equal protection of presidents” requires that all be 
treated as identical to one another. 
We think this consensus is tragically mistaken, not only as a 
matter of intellectual analysis, but, quite possibly, with regard to 
the actual future of what Burke might have referred to as the 
living and the yet unborn. We agree with the major premise. 
Constitutional decision makers, when assessing President 
Trump’s actions, should be guided by constitutional norms. We 
disagree, however, with the near universal view that those norms 
are indifferent to the particular office-holder. The Constitution 
presupposes at least some version of what we call “Publian 
presidents,” presidents with the character and capacity necessary 
to exercise the vast powers conferred by Article II. 
The term “Publian presidents” is drawn from The Federalist 
Papers. Although we are not “originalists” as that term is used in 
intra-mural debates among constitutional interpreters, we do 
believe that understanding the knowable presuppositions 
underlying the constitutional text is important. Americans do not 
have a rigid duty to adhere to past norms or empirical 
assumptions as to how institutions would work to achieve those 
norms, but constitutional fidelity entails an intellectual duty to 
examine how those responsible for the Constitution of the United 
 
he had not resided altogether fourteen years in the states?” Id. at 357. Fortunately, these 
speculations are beyond the scope of this article. 
 51 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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States thought constitutional institutions would work to achieve 
constitutional norms, as well as to understand the back-up 
systems they did (or did not) put in place, should particular 
constitutional institutions fail. A wooden esteem for the 
Founders’ parchment ignores their repeated emphasis on the 
importance of learning from the “lessons of experience.” John 
Marshall proclaimed in McCulloch v. Maryland that a 
“constitution[] intended to endure for ages to come” must “be 
adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”52 We break faith 
with the framers and the American constitutional tradition when 
we treat the Constitution as a mere set of rules that must be 
followed even when following the letter of the rules subverts 
more fundamental constitutional purposes. 
The presidency of Donald Trump is one such “crisis of human 
affairs” calling for constitutional adaptation. The framers, we 
shall see, anticipated the possibility of such a constitutional 
failure and provided constitutional decision makers with special 
tools for constraining the anti-Publian president. They regarded 
as only a rebuttable presumption that the President of the 
United States would be a mature adult. Unlike Justice Antonin 
Scalia, who regarded as a conclusive presumption that any child 
born within a marriage was fathered by the husband, whatever 
the demonstrable impossibility of that assertion,53 the framers 
were empiricists committed to an evidence-based constitutional 
politics and constitutional law.54 
The selection process set out in the Constitution with regard 
to presidents exhibits both the framing commitment to 
republican leadership and their insistence that Americans be 
empirically minded when determining how to obtain republic 
leaders. As is well known, Americans were not (and are not 
today) given the opportunity directly to elect their presidents. 
That task is assigned to presidential electors. Not surprisingly, 
immediately after assuring his readers that the president would 
not enjoy the powers of a monarch in Federalist No. 67,55 Publius 
immediately turns in Federalist No. 68 to elaborate how the 
 
 52 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis removed). 
 53 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989). 
 54 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION xv (1996). 
 55 THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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constitutional scheme for a presidential election is designed to 
guarantee, as far as is humanly possible, the selection of persons 
with exceptional capacities and virtuous character.56  
This process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of 
president, will seldom fall to the lot of any man, who is not in an 
eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for 
low intrigue and the little arts of popularity may alone suffice to 
elevate a man to the first honors in a single state; but it will require 
other talents and a different kind of merit to establish him in the 
esteem and confidence of the whole union, or of so considerable a 
portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate 
for the distinguished office of president of the United States. It will 
not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability 
of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability 
and virtue.57 
Publius hedged when asserting that the electoral college will 
assure that only “seldom” will the president be less than a 
sterling individual. That suggests the importance of other, 
“auxiliary precautions” to which we will turn presently. But one 
cannot read this paragraph without believing that the electors 
will be faithful trustees for the public in preventing the rise of a 
scoundrel to our highest office. That this no longer describes the 
actual role of electors, who are now viewed simply as “delegates” 
of the voters who formally placed them in power, increases the 
importance of other institutional mechanisms that secure the 
election of a president with the character and capacity to operate 
the constitutional order. If such mechanisms no longer exist, 
then this raises fundamental questions about the relevance of 
“originalism” in a constitutional universe bereft of the 
institutions the framers thought vital to maintaining the 
constitutional order they fashioned. 
Publius discusses the character of the president before 
discussing presidential powers. One can reasonably infer that the 
scope of presidential powers is a function of the character of the 
office-holder. Consider in this context the pardon power, 
discussed in Federalist No. 74.58 A president must know when 
mercy is required to rectify the inevitable errors in a system of 
 
 56 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 460–61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961). 
 57 Id. 
 58 THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 500–03 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961). 
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procedural justice; but he must also know when service to the 
republic requires pardoning even those who might validly be 
accused of insurrection, like the participants in the Whiskey 
Rebellion who were wisely pardoned by George Washington. 
Publius tightly connects presidential power and presidential 
character when stating, “a single man of prudence and good 
sense, is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the 
motives, which may plead for and against the remission of the 
punishment, than any numerous body whatever.”59 Prior to 
Donald Trump and his pardon of “Sheriff Joe” Arpaio, one could 
only speculate about what a president lacking in “prudence and 
good sense” might make of the plenary power to pardon. 
The theme of virtuous leadership runs through The 
Federalist Papers, including the most canonical of all, Federalist 
No. 10.60 Although some political scientists interpret Federalist 
No. 10 as the first statement of what would come to be known as 
interest-group pluralism,61 any close reading reveals the 
likelihood of an “expanded republic” producing the election of 
more virtuous leaders disposed to seek the public good or 
“common interest,” rather than simply reflect the preferences of 
their constituents.62 Other papers elaborate on the importance of 
the character of the officials who will be exercising constitutional 
powers. Federalist No. 57 declares that every political 
Constitution should strike above all “to obtain for rulers, men 
who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue 
the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the 
most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they 
continue to hold their public trust.”63 
Federalist No. 31 makes intimate the connection between the 
character of an official and official powers. The text states that 
“all observations founded upon the danger of usurpation, ought to 
be referred to the composition and structure of the government, 
 
 59 Id. at 501–02. 
 60 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 61 See, e.g., Martin Diamond, Democracy and the Federalist: A Reconsideration of the 
Framer’s Intent, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 52, 56 (1959). 
 62 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59, 63 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(noting that elections in the extended republic “will be more likely to centre on men who 
possess the most attractive merit”). 
 63 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 384 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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not to the nature or extent of its powers.”64 Good government, 
Publius repeatedly insists, needs broad powers.65 For this reason, 
Americans then and now should not be obsessed with the powers 
of the national government or with the powers of any individual 
within the government. Rather, Publius would concentrate our 
constitutional focus on whether the schemes for staffing 
a government privilege the selection of persons able to 
wisely exercise government powers. Presidential power is 
constitutionally justified when the process for staffing the 
presidency has generated “characters pre-eminent for ability and 
virtue.”66 Contrary to one popular view of the Constitution as a 
“machine that will run by itself,”67 independent of the actual 
office-holders, Publius was more than aware that character was 
important even if he certainly did pay attention to the 
importance of well-designed institutional structures. Indeed, The 
Federalist Papers integrates character and institutions. The 
machine would “run by itself” only if the institutional structures 
privileged the establishment of a republican leadership class and 
provided incentives for maintaining their republican character 
when in office. 
These observations cast new light on Publius’s claim in 
Federalist No. 51 that the separation of powers is an “auxiliary 
precaution.”68 A back-up generator is an auxiliary precaution, not 
the main power supply. A crucial feature of an auxiliary 
precaution is that the system functions differently in times of 
emergency. The back-up generator comes on only when the main 
power fails. “Checks and balances” function similarly; other 
institutions must step up more vigorously when constitutional 
institutions, designed to ensure virtuous leadership, malfunction 
and produce persons who lack the capacities that justify the 
powers of their office and consequent respect from other officials. 
This should not be viewed as “civil disobedience” or any other 
extra-constitutional assertions of power, but instead, as the 
 
 64 THE FEDERALIST NO. 31, at 197 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 65 This is the central theme of Federalist No. 23. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 
(Alexander Hamilton). 
 66 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 67 See, e.g., MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE 
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. ed., 1986). 
 68 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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generation of a “legal-constitutional opposition”69 contemplated 
by the drafters themselves and instantiated in the institutions 
they created. 
If presidential powers are justified by the anticipated 
character of the president, and if the separation of powers exists 
in part to prevent leadership by unfit officials, then contrary to 
much received wisdom, the persons responsible for the 
Constitution did not intend for constitutional decision makers 
charged with maintaining it to be indifferent to the character of 
the president when assessing at any given time how much 
executive power a particular president should wield. Publius 
would not have constitutional interpreters be president-
indifferent. The Federalist Papers point to an important auxiliary 
precaution in the original Constitution when emphasizing the 
capacity for federal legislative and judicial officials to afford less 
deference to an anti-Publian president.  
III. GOING OFF-SCRIPT AND BROKEN PLAYS 
Our claim that interpretation responds to breakdowns in 
underlying assumptions is more ordinary than extraordinary. 
Contract law and contract practice make adjustments when 
background conditions that structured the bargain change in 
ways not anticipated by the parties. Actors go off-script when 
props malfunction or other actors forget previous lines. Athletes 
improvise when the play called in the huddle breaks down 
because of unforeseen developments. Conventional constitutional 
wisdom that paradoxically is labeled “textualism” from the 
perspective of these activities is both extraordinary and perverse 
in insisting that constitutional decision makers not take into 
account failings that any person with common sense would 
recognize compel changing planned behaviors that have become 
either impossible to perform or counterproductive. 
The long tradition in American constitutionalism that 
regards the Constitution of the United States70 as a collective 
contract provides powerful support for interpreting constitutional 
 
 69 We owe this phrase to Ken Kersch, who provided very helpful comments to an 
earlier draft. 
 70 See Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 
1, 2–4 (1999). 
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provisions in light of their background assumptions. Contract 
law does not interpret every provision of a contract as having a 
“no matter what” clause. Charles Fried, when analyzing the 
famous case of Krell v. Henry,71 points out that the contract for 
rooms to watch the coronation procession of Edward VII 
contained neither the clause “unless there is no procession to 
view” nor the clause “whether or not the coronation is 
subsequently canceled.”72 Because the decision to enforce the 
literal terms of the bargain was just as much an interpretation as 
a decision to interpret the contract as not covering a cancellation, 
Fried maintains that contract authorities had to consider which 
interpretation best expressed the promises the parties made to 
each other in light of a circumstance neither anticipated. Krell, 
he concluded, correctly recognized that the contract between the 
parties made sense only on the assumption that the coronation 
would take place as planned, and that no damages should be paid 
when events falsified that mutual assumption.73 
Contract law in practice is even less committed to the 
wooden textualism that would insert “no matter what” clauses 
into all provisions in Article II. Stewart Macaulay’s study of 
contractual relationships among businesspersons observes: 
Disputes are frequently settled without reference to the contract or 
potential or actual legal sanctions. There is a hesitancy to speak of 
legal rights or to threaten to sue in these negotiations. Even where 
the parties have a detailed and carefully planned agreement which 
indicates what is to happen if, say, the seller fails to deliver on time, 
often they will never refer to the agreement but will negotiate a 
solution when the problem arises apparently as if there had never 
been any original contract. One purchasing agent expressed a common 
business attitude when he said, “if something comes up, you get the 
other man on the telephone and deal with the problem. You don’t read 
legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever want to do 
business again.”74 
A constitution “intended to endure for ages to come,” a good 
businessperson would recognize, should be interpreted in 
 
 71 Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 KB 740 (Eng.). 
 72 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
64 (1981). 
 73 See id. at 60–61, 67.  
 74 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 
28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 61 (1963). 
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ways that are responsive to failures in the functioning of 
basic institutions. 
Actors engage in similar improvisations as businesspersons 
when faced with what contract law might call “frustration” of 
script.75 The swan in Lohengrin fails to show up. The pulley 
taking Don Juan to the underworld fails. A phone rings off cue. A 
nervous performer completely misses crucial lines.76 When these 
events occur, experienced, and most inexperienced, actors 
respond. Sometimes a bon mot seems appropriate. “Does anyone 
know when the next swan is leaving?” “It seems Hell has no 
vacancies.” An apocryphal story relates that one actor picked up 
the phone and promptly handed the receiver to the other, saying, 
“It’s for you.” In other circumstances, actors adjust their lines to 
the circumstances. They do not woodenly repeat the next line in 
the script when the failure to say an earlier line makes their 
planned line incomprehensible. Instead, actors think about what 
they might say to enable the cast to perform the play as close to 
as originally intended under the new, unanticipated circumstances. 
Athletes respond the same way as businesspersons and 
actors to failures in the assumptions underlying their texts. 
Gifted sportspersons improvise when a play breaks down, as 
when a baseball batter misses a hit-and-run signal or a football 
receiver runs the wrong route. Faced with circumstances in 
which following the letter of the plan will defeat the purpose of 
the plan, athletes attempt to figure out alternatives for achieving 
the purpose of the plan, knowing that while some members of 
their team have failed, others are performing their expected 
tasks. The runner scrambles back to first base. The quarterback 
throws the ball to whatever receiver appears open. 
The routine practices of businesspersons, actors, and 
athletes illustrate how texts are routinely interpreted differently 
when crucial background conditions fail. To be sure, the reasons 
for going off-script must usually be plain.77 Strong presumptions 
 
 75 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265–69 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 76 For some of these and related mishaps discussed in this paragraph, see ANDREW 
FOLDI, OPERA: AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN (40 YEARS OF MUSICAL MISHAPS) (1999); 
Dick Cavett, Oh, No! Live Drama and Unwritten Humor, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/opinion/oh-no-live-drama-and-unwritten-humor.html. 
 77 We might trust an experienced actor or athlete to make judgments to go off-script 
that we would deny to their less experienced peers. 
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exist in most interpretive practices that background conditions 
are functioning smoothly. Nevertheless, improvisation plays an 
important role in text-bound activities. When systematic 
malfunctions occur, businesspersons, actors, and athletes engage 
in a Dworkinian effort to make the text “the best it can be.”78 If a 
contract to purchase weapons for a third party should be 
interpreted on the assumption that the third party has not joined 
a terrorist cell or indicated a strong desire to murder an 
estranged spouse, a script should be interpreted on the 
assumption that the phone will ring on cue, and a play should be 
interpreted on the assumption that crucial participants have not 
suffered serious injuries, then the constitutional clause “the 
President shall be Commander-in-Chief”79 should be interpreted 
in light of the assumption that the president is a mature adult 
whom one would, at the bare minimum, feel comfortable hiring to 
watch over one’s own children. 
IV. JUDICIAL IMPROVISATION IN TIMES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
FAILURE 
The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently 
adjusted constitutional doctrine when responding to breakdowns 
in the fundamental assumptions underlying the constitutional 
order. That tribunal for more than two-hundred years has been 
Marshallian, with judicial “adaptation” a regular feature of the 
attempt to resolve perceived crises. Some crises are external. 
Supreme Court Justices have adjusted existing constitutional 
doctrine in light of wars and economic depressions. Other crises 
are internal. Much constitutional law, most notably the 
constitutional law fashioned by mid-twentieth century judicial 
liberals and the civil rights movement, has been a consequence of 
adjustments made when constitutional institutions have not 
functioned as expected. 
Much constitutional doctrine that takes circumstances into 
account reflects framing understandings that crisis would shake 
the American constitutional regime and constitutional law would 
adjust accordingly. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Schenck v. 
United States refrained from wooden textualism when asserting 
 
 78 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 62 (1986). 
 79 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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that “[w]hen a nation is at war,” the speech entitled to 
constitutional protection shifts.80 In other cases, Justices have 
adjusted constitutional doctrine to take into account crises no one 
anticipated in 1789 or 1868. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes 
in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell held that 
constitutional protections for contracts had to be interpreted in 
light of an economic collapse unforeseen by the framers.81 His 
opinion insisted that constitutional decision makers committed to 
“preserv[ing] the essential content and the spirit of the 
Constitution”82 could not “confine[]” themselves “to the 
interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook 
of their time, would have placed upon” various clauses.83 No 
universal agreement exists about the validity or desirability of 
these and numerous other “adaptations.” Prigg v. Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania,84 which one of us (Levinson) believes to be the 
most execrable decision in our history, was arguably a “necessary 
adaption” designed to maintain a constitutional order designed to 
create, in Don Fehrenbacher’s words, a “slaveholding republic.”85 
We are nevertheless confident that Americans cannot understand 
their constitutional order by ignoring how decision makers, 
including judges, treat what they believe to be genuine crises as 
matters that must be addressed by the constitutional doctrine 
rather than matters beneath the purview of fundamental law that 
should be simply ignored. 
The Supreme Court has been as creative when adapting 
constitutional doctrine to internal constitutional crises. The most 
famous footnote in the canon, footnote four of United States v. 
Carolene Products Co.,86 exemplifies the judicial response to what 
came to be perceived as the constitutional failure of governing 
 
 80 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919) (“When a nation is at war 
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that 
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight[.]”). 
 81 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934). 
 82 Id. at 443. 
 83 Id. 
 84 41 U.S. 539 (1842). 
 85 DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001). For 
an account of Prigg as an unfortunate constitutional adaption, see Paul Finkelman, Story 
Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial 
Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247 (1994). For a more sympathetic treatment, see generally 
MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006). 
 86 See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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institutions adequately to protect the rights of vulnerable 
minorities granted by the post-Civil War Amendments. The 
Court, when announcing a program of remarkable deference to 
legislatures when litigators challenged state and federal 
commercial regulations, emphasized that stricter scrutiny might 
be merited when courts had greater reasons to believe ordinary 
legislative processes had malfunctioned.87 The Supreme Court’s 
“double standard” of rights protection that emerged in the 
mid-twentieth century was rooted in theories about the strength 
and weaknesses of evolving constitutional institutions, rather 
than on claims that some constitutional rights were more 
important than others. The consensual greatest series of 
decisions in Supreme Court history, Brown v. Board of 
Education88 and the subsequent judicial rulings dismantling the 
constitutional foundations for the Jim Crow state, required the 
justices to modify longstanding judicial rules and practices to 
prevent former Confederate states from getting away with what 
they now deemed to be the equivalent of constitutional fraud, 
instead of accepting the anodyne and remarkably obtuse 
“neutrality” and deferential stance of such earlier decisions as 
Pace v. Alabama and Plessy v. Ferguson.89 
Louis Lusky, the law clerk generally considered responsible 
for the Carolene Products footnote,90 maintained that justices 
should normally sustain legislative outputs when political 
processes were functioning as constitutionally expected. His 1942 
essay in the Yale Law Review asserted: 
[I]f every person has an equal opportunity to take part in controlling 
the government which in turn controls him, there will be a general 
confidence that the laws are designed to serve the needs of the entire 
community, by making a fair adjustment between the conflicting 
interests of groups within the community and advancing as far as 
possible the welfare of the community as a whole.91 
Race discrimination merited stricter judicial scrutiny because 
constitutional institutions repeatedly malfunctioned when 
 
 87 Id. 
 88 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 89 See Pace v. Alabama, 545 U.S. 1108 (2005); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537 (1896). 
 90 David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights: 
Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741, 765 (1981). 
 91 Louis Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1942). 
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elected officials considered racial issues. “A government from 
which [African-Americans] are largely excluded,” Lusky pointed 
out, is not “properly responsible to their needs” with the end 
result being that “general confidence in the just enactment of 
laws will be greatly weakened.”92 The text of footnote four is a bit 
confusing because two distinctive Carolene Products footnotes 
exist. Paragraph 1, which was inserted at the request of Chief 
Justice Hughes,93 maintains “certain rights deserve particular 
judicial solicitude.”94 The far more influential paragraphs 2 and 
3, providing the foundation for judicial protection of rights to free 
speech and racial equality, are rooted in the “dynamics of 
government,”95 a “corrective” for faulty “political processes.”96 
 The Carolene Products double standard was a judicial 
attempt to adjust to two fundamental changes in the American 
constitutional regime. The first was the constitutional 
commitment to some version of interest-group pluralism as 
opposed to the original constitutional commitment to some version 
of republicanism. Lusky, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, and 
other constitutional decision makers in the mid-twentieth century 
assumed that constitutional institutions should be designed in 
ways that accommodated various social interests as opposed to 
the Madisonian vision of government institutions designed to 
transcend various social interests.97 The second was the 
increased recognition that “prejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities”98 prevented most elected officials from 
accommodating the interests of persons of color to remotely the 
same degree as white persons. Hence, in contrast to the original 
understanding of the post-Civil War Amendments,99 courts 
 
 92 Id. at 5–6. 
 93 See Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1093, 1097–98 (1982). 
 94 Id. at 1100 (emphasis removed). 
 95 Id. at 1097–98. 
 96 Id. at 1103. 
 97 For the classic expression of interest group pluralism, see DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE 
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (Alfred A. Knopf 
eds., 1951). Federalist No. 10 is the classic expression of constitutional republicanism. See 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961). For the classic account (and critique) of the transition from 
republicanism to interest-group liberalism, see THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF 
LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (1st ed. 2009). 
 98 United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 99 See Mark A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEXAS 
L. REV. 1361, 1363 (2016). 
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rather than legislatures took primary responsibility for securing 
African-Americans and other racial minorities the “equal 
protection of the law.” 
In “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,” 
Professor Wechsler unwittingly detailed how the Supreme Court 
in Brown engaged in the constitutional improvisation called for 
by Carolene Products to correct what were now deemed the 
constitutional failures responsible for Jim Crow segregation.100 
Wechsler insisted that the “question posed by state-enforced 
segregation is not one of discrimination at all,” but concerned 
“the denial by the state of freedom to associate, a denial that 
impinges in the same way on any groups or races that may be 
involved.”101 He reached the remarkable conclusion that Brown 
was a freedom of association case by denying that judicial 
authorities could know the crucial facts that might make Brown 
a discrimination case. Such an approach was warranted on 
matters on which courts should trust state officials. What Chief 
Justice Warren understood, and Wechsler failed to acknowledge, 
is that no reason existed in 1954 (or, for that matter, in 1896 
when Plessy was decided) to trust a state legislative judgment 
that separate schools promoted racial equality. The 
“reconciliation” between Northern and Southern whites that 
placed African-Americans both literally and metaphorically at 
the back of the railway left neither Congress nor the courts 
willing to implement the post-Civil War Amendments. 
Fortunately, in ways “neutral principles” could not detect, 
American politics had changed, particularly after World War II, 
as well as the role of the Court. 
Wechsler’s analysis of Brown presented an accurate picture 
of how courts should function in normal constitutional times in a 
regime committed to interest group pluralism. He began by 
noting that justices have legal obligations to defer to legislative 
fact-findings.102 Wechsler then denied that the evidence was 
sufficient “to sustain a finding that the separation harms the 
Negro children who may be involved[.]”103 Nor, apparently, could 
courts ask about what actually motivated state legislatures to 
 
 100 See Wechsler, supra note 2, at 22–23. 
 101 Id. at 34. 
 102 Id. at 6. 
 103 Id. at 32–33. 
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impose segregation. To inquire into the actual justification for 
segregation would “involve an inquiry into the motive of the 
legislature, which is generally foreclosed to the courts[.]”104  
These claims that courts should normally defer to legislative 
fact-findings and not inquire into legislative motives make sense 
when, as Lusky noted, political processes are fair and open to all 
so that political victors at any particular time might be fearful of 
being displaced in the next election should they prove captive 
simply to factional interests. This is the basis of John Hart Ely’s 
aforementioned book that defends a vigorous concern by the 
Court for “representation reinforcement,” but condemns judicial 
intervention when representative government is thought to be 
working reasonably well.105 Elected officials can then be trusted 
to make good faith interpretations of the Constitution and take 
rational steps to pursue the public good. Aggressive judicial 
inquiry into facts and motives is counter-constitutional in times 
of normal constitutional politics. The system for staffing the 
national government and process for making laws are the 
main devices for ensuring that elected officials make accurate 
fact-findings and do not deliberately violate the Constitution. No 
good reason exists for thinking courts will do any better than the 
rest of the political system, especially if we are willing to accept 
what may well be the legal fiction that Publian institutions are 
generating Publian or quasi-Publian rulers and laws. This is why 
the Supreme Court in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma106 
subordinated suspicions that the Oklahoma legislature might 
have been influenced by campaign donations of optometrists and 
ophthalmologists when applying what is known as a “minimum 
rationality test” that makes such suspicions irrelevant if a 
possibly sane person could believe that the legislature was 
genuinely motivated by a desire to safeguard the health, safety, 
and welfare of Oklahomans. Perhaps eye-doctors did better with 
respect to this law than the general public, but no good reason 
existed to think that optometrists and ophthalmologists were 
“special favorite[s] of the law”107 in post-World War II Oklahoma. 
 
 104 Id. at 33. 
 105 See ELY, supra note 18, at 182–83. 
 106 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955). 
 107 United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). 
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The Southern white political actors who imposed 
state-mandated segregation were not attempting to do what was 
best for all races or acting on a good faith interpretation of the 
post-Civil War Amendments. White elected officials in the former 
Confederacy did not fear electoral displacement by aroused 
African-American voters because they had taken care, by the 
beginning of the twentieth century, to eliminate as much as 
possible the reality of an African-American vote. Rather, as 
speaker after speaker declared in the southern constitutional 
conventions that provided the legal foundations for the Jim Crow 
state,108 members of former Confederate states were trying to 
find every constitutional loophole in order to subvert the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s constitutional commitment to racial 
equality and, most importantly, the ostensibly unequivocal 
commitment of the Fifteenth Amendment to the suffrage on a 
non-racial basis. They were openly committing what Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes described as “a fraud upon the 
Constitution of the United States.”109 In sharp contrast to 
Wechsler, Holmes did not deny the presence of the fraud. 
Instead, he said judges were without the practical power to 
reinstate the kind of Reconstruction-era monitoring that would 
be necessary to obviate the fraud.110  
Brown makes sense only in light of a judicial commitment to 
eradicate frauds upon the Constitution. Chief Justice Warren in 
judicial conference had no difficulty basing his vote on motives 
and facts the court had ruled out-of-bounds in ordinary cases. He 
bluntly informed other justices that segregation was based solely 
on white supremacy. “The doctrine of ‘separate but equal,’” he 
stated when leading off the judicial conference on Brown, “rested 
 
 108 See PAUL E. HERRON, FRAMING THE SOLID SOUTH 217–25 (2017). 
 109 Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903); see also Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, 
Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 205, 297, 301–02 (2000) (describing 
a full examination of this truly perfidious episode in our judicial history). 
 110 See Giles, 189 U.S. at 488. There was no nonsense about “neutral principles” 
compelling the outcome in Giles. The Court’s decision in Brown II was quite Holmesian 
inasmuch as the decision to settle for “all deliberate speed” was based on pragmatic 
institutional considerations that were inattentive to facts on the ground. What made 
Wechsler’s views distinctive was his utter indifference to pragmatic actualities and the 
ascent into a thoroughly abstract analysis reminiscent of Anatole France’s famous 
suggestion that the rich and poor alike would enjoy the opportunity to spend their nights 
under the bridges of Paris when it snowed. 
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upon the concept[ion] of the inferiority of the colored race.”111 
Other justices agreed. Justice Robert Jackson, who more than 
any other justice recognized that Brown could not be resolved by 
the appropriate norms for resolving ordinary cases, determined 
to vote to constitutionally prohibit segregated schools because “in 
the South the Negro suffers from racial suspicions and 
antagonisms” and “has suffered great prejudice from the 
aftermath of the great American white conflict.”112 Jackson 
recognized how the original constitutional mechanisms for 
enforcing racial equality had malfunctioned when asserting in 
oral argument, “I suppose that realistically the reason this case 
is here is that action couldn’t be obtained from Congress.”113 
Charles Black best captured the contemporary sense of why 
Brown was correctly decided when he maintained: 
[I]f a whole race of people finds itself confined within a system which 
is set up and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in an 
inferior station, and if the question is then solemnly propounded 
whether such a race is being treated “equally,” I think we ought to 
exercise one of the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers—that 
of laughter.114 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the case in which the 
Supreme Court abandoned almost 200 years of precedent when 
declaring that the First Amendment prohibited libel suits by 
public officials unless they could prove the speech was either 
intentionally false, or false and made with reckless disregard of 
the truth, is another example of constitutional law bending in 
response to the breakdown of constitutional norms in the Jim 
Crow South.115 This strong and unprecedented116 holding was 
motivated by commitments to racial equality as much as 
 
 111 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICAN’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 679 (1976).  
 112 Id. at 688 (quoting Memorandum from Robert H. Jackson on Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ. (Feb. 15, 1954) (on file with Library of Congress)). 
 113 Joel K. Goldstein, Approaches to Brown v. Board of Education: Some Notes on 
Teaching a Seminal Case, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 777, 806 (2004) (quoting ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 7 (1970)). 
 114 Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 422, 
424 (1960). 
 115 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 116 Not quite. A few state courts had reached a similar result in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. See, e.g., Coleman v. McLennan, 98 P. 281, 292 (Kan. 
1908); Atkinson v. Detroit Free Press, 9 N.W. 501, 524 (Mich. 1881). For the origins of 
actual malice, see MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS 
LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 41–44 (1991). 
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commitments to the First Amendment. The Sullivan litigation 
was part of the southern strategy to prevent media coverage of 
the civil rights movement by imposing huge libel damages for 
minor misstatements.117 In the trial court, Lester Sullivan 
obtained the largest damages award in Alabama history. Had 
racial concerns been absent, everyone knew Sullivan probably 
would have received nominal damages at most. The Supreme 
Court decision overturning that ruling permitted The New York 
Times, as well as major television networks, to remain in the 
South and continue providing shocked Americans with stories of 
police dogs attacking children on peaceful protest marches.  
The Supreme Court in Sullivan also improvised when 
issuing final judgment. The Court in an ordinary case would 
have remanded the case back to the Alabama courts for 
reconsideration in light of the new constitutional standard for 
determining libel. The Justices knew, however, that Alabama 
legal authorities would not determine in good faith whether 
Sullivan was a victim of actual malice. Rather, Chief Justice 
Warren could be confident that the courts in Alabama would 
award damages no matter what the judicial standard. For this 
reason, the Justices broke from routine practice, made a fact 
finding that actual malice could not be found, and entered a final 
judgment for The New York Times.118 
Numerous other Warren Court decisions are best understood 
as the judges altering rules of normal practice to account for 
constitutional breakdowns in the Jim Crow South. Many of these 
cases were resolved on grounds other than racial equality. 
Michael Seidman details how the Justices conceptualized such 
cases as Miranda v. Arizona as responses to racist law 
enforcement practices rather than as efforts to construct neutral 
rules of constitutional criminal procedure that would apply in all 
times and places.119 A similar analysis could be offered of the 
motivation behind the Supreme Court’s decision to enter what 
 
 117 See KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: CIVIL 
RIGHTS, LIBEL LAW AND THE FREE PRESS 69–70 (2011). The national press could have lost 
millions of dollars in potential liability if they lost lawsuits filed throughout the South by 
purportedly aggrieved white segregationists. Id. at 84–85. 
 118 See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 285–86. 
 119 Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673 (1992); see 
also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Justice Felix Frankfurter called the “political thicket” of 
legislative districting120 in Baker v. Carr and then far more 
dramatically in Reynolds v. Sims, which upended the political 
systems of almost all the states.121 Earl Warren viewed these 
decisions as part of the “civil rights docket” of the Court, as 
means to ensure urban African-American votes counted as much 
as rural white votes.122 That Baker arose in Tennessee and 
Reynolds in Alabama was not coincidental, even if the doctrinal 
consequences, as in Sullivan, were national. “[T]he dominant 
motif of the Warren Court,” Lucas Powe details, was “an assault 
on the South as a unique legal and cultural region.”123 
The Supreme Court during the civil rights era was 
responding to the constitutional failure to protect the rights of 
African Americans rather than engaging in ordinary 
constitutional decision-making. Brown might be regarded as 
implementing the constitutional commitment to racial equality,124 
although when making that decision the Supreme Court did not 
take seriously the original understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,125 ignored evidence that Congress was primarily 
responsible for implementing the Fourteenth Amendment,126 
implicitly engaged in forbidden motive analysis, and did not give 
elected officials the deference appropriate when a constitutional 
order is functioning within normal parameters.127 Sullivan, 
Reynolds, Miranda, Morgan v. Virginia,128 and related cases 
however, belie constitutional politics as usual. The Supreme 
Court would not have dramatically changed the constitutional 
law of free speech, voting rights, constitutional criminal 
procedure, and the Dormant Commerce Clause had the Justices 
not regarded those cases as race cases and made rules to correct 
 
 120 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
 121 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 279–89 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 590–625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 122 See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 381 (1997). 
 123 LUCAS A. POWE JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 490 (2000). 
 124 See JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 230–31 (2011); Michael W. McConnell, 
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 952 (1995). 
 125 See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A 
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1884 (1995). 
 126 See Mark A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L. 
REV. 1361 (2016). 
 127 See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text. 
 128 328 U.S. 373, 374, 386 (1946) (striking down on Dormant Commerce Clause 
grounds a Virginia law mandating segregation on interstate and intra-state motor cars). 
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both the breakdown of constitutional norms in the Jim Crow 
South and the constitutional failure of the elected branches of 
the national government to respond to that breakdown.129 
Contemporary constitutional civil rights law was forged in failure. 
The Supreme Court has adjusted constitutional law when 
responding to acute constitutional failures, as well as the chronic 
failure of national, state, and local institutions to protect the 
rights of persons of color. During the Civil War, the Justices 
invented procedural mechanisms for avoiding ruling 
on the constitutional measures judicial majorities thought 
unconstitutional.130 Most notably, in Roosevelt v. Meyer, the 
Justices when holding no jurisdiction existed to determine 
whether the Legal Tender Act of 1863 was constitutional, ignored 
the provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789 giving the Supreme 
Court jurisdiction whenever a state court denied a claim of 
federal right.131 When peace was restored and normal 
constitutional operations returned, the Justices immediately 
overruled Roosevelt.132 The justices did not need decades to assess 
whether a constitutional breakdown had occurred. The Civil War 
Court abandoned precedent shortly after a constitutional crisis 
began and restored the status quo shortly after the constitutional 
crisis ended. 
V. FROM JIM CROW TO THE ANTI-PUBLIAN PRESIDENT 
Brown, Sullivan, and other seminal decisions dismantling 
the segregated state provide the road map for constitutional 
responses to the Anti-Publian presidency of Donald Trump. Both 
Jim Crow and Trump’s election occurred because constitutional 
institutions failed, whether the failure was inherent in the 
institutions themselves or in the people operating the 
constitutional institutions. Constitutional decision makers faced 
with constitutional failures, American history teaches, jettison 
rules of constitutional practice and constitutional interpretation 
rooted in assumptions that constitutional institutions are 
functioning normally. The Warren Court, when dismantling Jim 
 
 129 See supra notes 115–123 and accompanying text. 
 130 This paragraph summarizes Mark A. Graber, Legal, Strategic or Legal Strategy: 
Deciding to Decide During the Civil War and Reconstruction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND 
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 33–66 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006). 
 131 See Roosevelt v. Myers, 68 U.S. 512, 517 (1863). 
 132 See Trebilcock v. Wilson, 79 U.S. 687, 687 (1871). 
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Crow, abandoned presumptions that former Confederate states 
were making good faith interpretations of the Equal Protection 
Clause. The Justices on that tribunal refused to defer to decisions 
made by white supremacists in circumstances that justified 
substantial deference to elected officials committed to 
constitutional norms. They did not assume good motives or 
rational decision making when segregationists claimed that 
separate but equal benefited persons of all races. While Donald 
Trump remains president, judges and other governing officials, 
when interpreting such exercises of executive power as the travel 
ban, the ban on transgendered persons in the armed forces, the 
withholding of federal funds from sanctuary cities and orders to 
prosecute Trump’s political rivals should be similarly wary. They 
should assume that Trump is far more devoted to pandering to 
his base by keeping unconstitutional campaign promises rather 
than defer to post hoc accounts of the underlying facts invented 
by administration lawyers for litigation purposes only. No one 
should assume Trump is engaged in rational decision making in 
the public interest when he makes decisions that seem better 
explained by his family’s financial interests or his desire to avoid 
criminal prosecution. 
When an anti-Publian president runs for office repeatedly 
promising flagrant constitutional violations, courts should adopt 
the presumption that the efforts to implement that platform 
violate the Constitution until the program is redesigned in ways 
that eliminate unconstitutional features “root and branch.”133 
Donald Trump on the campaign trail declared he would prevent 
Muslims from immigrating to the United States.134 His first 
travel ban looked suspiciously like a Muslim ban. President 
Trump declared the executive order a travel ban.135 Lower courts 
were therefore correct in taking the President at his word rather 
than taking seriously the novel arguments administrative 
lawyers made in court when defending the constitutionality of 
the travel ban (“EO-2”). The Fourth Circuit, after pointing to 
 
 133 Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968). 
 134 These campaign statements are summarized in Int’l Refugee Assistance 
Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 575–76 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 135 Eugene Scott & Ariane de Vogue, Trump says he’s calling it a ‘travel ban,’ CNN 
(June 5, 2017, 2:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/05/politics/trump-travel-ban-
courts/index.html [http://perma.cc/LNL3-TUHH]. 
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Donald Trump’s “numerous campaign statements expressing 
animus towards the Islamic faith” and “his proposal to ban 
Muslims from entering the United States,” concluded: 
Plaintiffs have more than plausibly alleged that EO-2’s stated 
national security interest was provided in bad faith, as a pretext for 
its religious purpose. And having concluded that the “facially 
legitimate” reason proffered by the government is not “bona fide,” we 
no longer defer to that reason and instead may “look behind” EO-2.136 
Constitutional decision makers have no more reason to 
assume that Donald Trump’s executive orders are based on 
rational policy judgments than the Warren Court had to believe 
that segregated schools were grounded in reasonable pedagogy. 
The “minimum rationality” (or “rational basis”) test assumes a 
president (or other elected official) makes good faith efforts to 
pursue the common good or a plausible constitutional vision 
underlying the dominant political party.137 A president who has 
demonstrated a fondness for white supremacists138—more so 
than any other president since Woodrow Wilson left the White 
House—does not satisfy the conditions for deference on racial 
issues. A president who consistently puts his business interests 
ahead of the national interest139 does not meet the standard for 
deference when a potential conflict of interest is present. When 
Trump issues an executive order on matters that trench on race 
or Trump family business interests, other constitutional decision 
makers ought to demand a set of probable facts that clearly 
support the order, and not be satisfied with rationales developed 
for litigation purposes by the White House legal staff that bear 
little resemblance to the actual justifications for the announced 
policy. Members of the White House legal staff may have a 
lawyer’s duty to be “zealous” in presenting all conceivable 
arguments in favor of their client, although whether lawyers who 
collect their paychecks from the United States instead of from 
 
 136 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 591–92. For a similar argument, see 
Vicki Jackson & Judith Resnik, Against Deference: Considering the Trump Travel Ban, 
Take Care (Dec. 8, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/against-deference-considering-the-
trump-travel-ban [http://perma.cc/YED5-63L7]. 
 137 See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text. 
 138 See Bret Stephens, President Jabberwock and the Jewish Right, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
19, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2v9MUnk. 
 139 See Keith Whittington, Possibly Impeachable Offenses: The Need for Congressional 
Investigation, NISKANEN CENTER (Aug. 2, 2017), https://niskanencenter.org/blog/possibly-
impeachable-offenses/ [http://perma.cc/DG7L-79NK]. 
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Donald Trump personally can be singularly devoted to their 
individual client instead of the interests of the American people 
is debatable. Those on the receiving end of such argument labor 
more clearly under no such duty. 
Constitutional decision makers have no more reason for 
empowering Donald Trump to make complex policy decisions 
than they had to empower white supremacists to make decisions 
about race. The present delegation doctrine assumes a president 
has expertise or, more often, access to expertise on complex 
empirical and scientific questions.140 A president who does not 
care to be informed on and routinely lies about basic domestic 
and foreign policy matters141 does not meet this standard for 
open-ended delegations. Courts should therefore require clear 
statements from Congress that the Trump administration is 
authorized to make a policy before permitting the administration 
to make that policy. 
Many devices for disempowering the Trump administration 
apply standard judicial canons for avoiding constitutional 
litigation. Courts are expected to interpret statutes as not raising 
difficult constitutional problems, such as the scope of presidential 
authority, whenever possible. Justice Louis Brandeis, in 
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, famously declared: 
“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although 
properly presented by the record, if there is also some other 
ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”142 Given the 
probability that Donald Trump’s executive orders are based on 
unconstitutional motives, engage in unconstitutional self-dealing, 
or do not meet constitutional standards for rational policy 
making, the judicial obligation to refrain from making 
unnecessary constitutional decisions should compel courts to 
require Congress to delegate clearly when Congress wishes to 
empower Donald Trump. 
 
 140 See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405 (1928). 
 141 See David Leonhardt & Stuart A. Thompson, Trump’s Lies, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/23/opinion/trumps-lies. 
html?mcubz=0; see also David Brooks, Getting Trump Out of My Brain, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/opinion/getting-trump-out-of-my-
brain.html?mcubz=0 (“There’s nothing more to be learned about Trump’s mixture of 
ignorance, insecurity and narcissism. Every second spent on his bluster is more 
degrading than informative.”). 
 142 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936). 
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The constitutional universe will hardly fall apart should 
courts and other constitutional decision makers, explicitly or 
implicitly, engage in motive analysis, up the standard of scrutiny, 
and interpret statutes as not delegating power when adjudicating 
Trump Administration efforts to exercise Article II powers. The 
constitutional universe did not fall apart when the Supreme 
Court abandoned inherited practices in order to repair the 
constitutional breakdown caused when southern (and many 
northern) governing officials committed to white supremacy 
refused to make good faith interpretations of the Equal 
Protection Clause. The innocuous Brown opinion generated a 
healthy debate over what policies are entailed by a constitutional 
commitment to racial equality.143 On some doctrinal matters, 
most notably free speech, courts have largely retained precedents 
that supported civil rights protestors and media coverage of the 
civil rights movement.144 On other doctrinal matters, most 
notably state action, courts largely abandoned precedents that 
struck down Jim Crow practices when litigants sought to extend 
those decisions to non-racial matters.145 On still other doctrinal 
matters, most notably constitutional criminal procedure, liberals 
and conservatives dispute whether rules put in force to prevent 
official racial abuses should remain in place today.146  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County, Alabama 
v. Holder147 illustrates how Supreme Court Justices debate the 
status of precedents that respond to constitutional failures. All 
parties to that case agreed that “[t]he Voting Rights Act of 1965 
employed extraordinary measures to address an extraordinary 
problem.”148 Chief Justice John Roberts began his opinion by 
recognizing that “racial discrimination in voting” was “an 
insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in 
certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious 
defiance of the Constitution,” and that “exceptional conditions 
 
 143 See Mark A. Graber, The Price of Fame: Brown as Celebrity, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 939, 
1004–08 (2008). 
 144 See, e.g., Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852 (2014). 
 145 See Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 273, 276–77 (2010). 
 146 See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting). 
 147 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 148 Id. at 2618. 
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can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.”149 
Roberts then announced that the test originally adopted by 
Congress when passing the seminal Voting Rights Act of 1965 
that triggered what might well be called “strict scrutiny” by the 
Justice Department over any changes in voting laws by states 
was no longer needed in 2013, and therefore had become 
unconstitutional as an unnecessary incursion on state 
autonomy.150 Justice Ginsburg insisted that the prophylactic 
rules adopted by Congress in 1965 still made sense and that the 
judicial policy of deferring to Congressional judgment as to the 
remedies for voting discrimination should be maintained.151 Both 
Roberts and Ginsburg endorsed judicial decisions that adjusted 
constitutional doctrine in response to failures within the 
constitutional order. They disputed only whether those failures 
had been corrected and whether doctrine forged in constitutional 
failure ought to be maintained for the foreseeable future.152 
The dispute between Roberts and Ginsburg in Shelby County 
highlights how the present question is not whether limits on the 
singular presidency of Donald Trump should apply forever to all 
future presidents. Future constitutional decision makers may 
conclude that both Trump and the rules used to constrain Trump 
were temporary aberrations or they may conclude that Trump 
represented a more enduring change in the American 
constitutional order that requires more enduring doctrinal 
adjustments. “Adaptation” by definition must be responsive to 
circumstances, but what those circumstances are and whether 
they warrant adaption is always controversial. The question is 
when what appears to be “settled doctrines” warrant some degree 
of “unsettlement” in light of what may be temporary aberrations 
or enduring changes in a constitutional order. If judicial decisions 
limiting the power of the Trump Administration unsettle 
constitutional law a bit, that may be a good thing,153 reminding 
us of the continuing wisdom of Justice Holmes’s placement of 
 
 149 Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309, 334 (1966)). 
 150 Id. at 2631. 
 151 Id. at 2652 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 152 Compare id. at 2625 (“Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically.”), 
with id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting ongoing “‘second generation barriers’ to 
minority voting”). 
 153 See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE 
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 6–8 (2001). 
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“experience” over “logic” as the most important motivating force 
for an effective legal order.154 
CONCLUSION 
Clinton Rossiter some seventy years ago published a truly 
important and disturbing book on the phenomenon of what he 
called “constitutional dictatorship.”155 Drawing in his American 
chapter primarily on Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt, he argued 
that in times of crisis, the United States, like Great Britain, 
France, and Germany (and ancient Rome), placed near-plenary 
power in their leaders to confront perceived crises.156 Rossiter 
dismissed any argument that we could in fact eliminate the 
need for “constitutional dictatorship.”157 That would require 
eliminating the presence of emergencies or crises that elicited 
displays of what could, under ordinary times, be described as 
presidential overreaching. Contemporary presidential power is 
here to stay, even if modified to some degree. More than ever, we 
have good reason to ask about the trustworthiness of presidents 
in whose hands we necessarily place immense powers that quite 
literally touch on national and world survival.  
Problems with presidential impeachments, as well as the 
enormous power of the president, further support our claims that 
non-Publian presidents ought not be trusted with Publian 
powers. An August poll revealed that forty-three percent of those 
surveyed support Trump’s impeachment, with twelve percent 
supporting censure by Congress.158 By October 31st, according to 
Public Policy Polling, the number had climbed to forty-nine 
percent, with only forty-one percent opposed.159 Still, this 
solution is close to a fantasy. Whether one believes that the 
framers in Philadelphia explicitly rejected making 
 
 154 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n ed. 1881). 
 155 See generally CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS 
GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1979); Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, 
Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789 (2010). 
 156 ROSSITER, supra note 155, at 207–314. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Tom O’Connor, Trump Impeachment Is Most Popular Solution Among Americans, 
Poll Says, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 26, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-
impeachment-most-popular-solution-americans-655556 [http://perma.cc/ZY36-SSVX]. 
 159 See Support for Impeachment at Record High, PUBLIC POLICY POLLING 
(Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.publicpolicypolling.com/polls/support-impeachment-record-
high/ [http://perma.cc/YU4N-2TYA]. 
Do Not Delete 3/21/18 4:40 PM 
2018] The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian Presidents 171 
administrative “malfeasance” a ground for impeachment,160 or 
instead simply thinks Republicans in Congress—out of party 
loyalty or fear of their base—will not impeach for political 
malfeasance,161 advocating impeachment or invoking the 
Twenty-fifth Amendment at present is a form of expressive 
politics unresponsive to the constitutional problems presented by 
a lawless chief law enforcement officer of the land and a 
Commander-in-Chief who lacks the emotional maturity to toss off 
even trivial slights. 
One possible argument against our claim that the 
constitutional powers of the president are not indifferent to the 
officeholder is the possibility that the Framers of the 
Constitution, fearing human infallibility, drew firm lines in the 
sand. This constitution is one of fixed rules because human 
beings are tempted to abuse power otherwise.162 The Constitution 
of the United States “view[s] the abuse of power as the 
paramount evil,” Frederick Schauer maintains, and “thus 
choose[s] to minimize the occasions on which the abuse of power 
is not blocked, even at the cost of . . . imped[ing] the pursuit of 
the Good.”163 Those who take this view believe that even if acting 
on the consensual view that President Trump is unfit to hold 
office will have good short-term consequences, constitutional 
rules should be woodenly followed because in the long run, 
constitutional decision makers are more likely to misuse, rather 
than properly use, authority to constrain a president they believe 
a menace to constitutional government and perhaps to regime 
and human survival.164 
 
 160 See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 114–15 (2006). 
 161 For an argument that Congress may impeach for political malfeasance, see 
Whittington, supra note 139. 
 162 See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED 21 (2012). 
 163 Frederick Schauer, The Constitution as Text and Rule, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41, 
50 (1987). 
 164 See Jonathan Turley, What’s worse than leaving Trump in office? 
Impeaching him., WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
posteverything/wp/2017/08/24/whats-worse-than-leaving-trump-in-office-impeaching-him/? 
utm_term=.10c28cfcdf40 [http://perma.cc/8T96-H3RC] for a fine example of such 
woodenness. Turley fears that impeaching Trump, at least on the basis of what is known 
about him as of late August 2017, “would fundamentally alter the presidency, potentially 
setting up future presidents to face impeachment inquiries or even removal whenever the 
political winds shifted against them.” Id. Turley does not provide any reason for thinking 
Trump is fit to hold office. He does not deny, for example, that the Constitution of the 
United States presently entrusts a president who cannot ignore the most trivial insult 
with the power to begin a nuclear war. Turley’s argument, an example of neutral 
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The problem with interpreting constitutional powers as 
officeholder-indifferent is that The Federalist Papers make clear 
that the Constitution of fixed rules is not the Constitution of the 
United States. The fixed rules that comprise what Levinson 
terms the “Constitution of Settlement” concern the rules for 
staffing offices and making laws.165 The powers of each branch of 
the national government are as much a part of what Levinson 
terms the “Constitution of Conversation” as the “majestic 
generalities” of the Fourteenth Amendment.166 Some constitutional 
rules explain why presidents are elected like clockwork every four 
years.167 Other constitutional provisions explain why presidential 
power varies considerably over time and with each president; 
Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan were given far more 
deference by other officeholders than Herbert Hoover or Andrew 
Johnson.168 Treating Donald Trump as a normal president 
exercising normal Article II powers would be a far greater break 
from this historical practice than recognizing that a bigoted, 
ignorant liar should not be accorded the same deference as a 
president who might plausibly claim to be “pre-eminent for 
ability and virtue.”169 
The obvious question in 2018 is whether realists committed 
to an experience-based politics should expect highly partisan 
members of Congress—and judges who are increasingly 
themselves identify with a single political party—to play their 
Publian role. That the answer may be no speaks to what Jack 
Balkin has termed “constitutional rot,”170 not to the underlying 
presuppositions of the Publian constitutional order that, 
paradoxically or not, most Americans profess to respect. The 
strongest response to our argument is that (almost) no one today 
 
principles run riot, is equivalent to the claim that Congress should not ban human 
sacrifices for fear of creating a precedent that might empower the national legislature in 
the future to ban religion. 
 165 Levinson, supra note 162, at 19. 
 166 Id. at 278. 
 167 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 168 For studies demonstrating variance in presidential power over time and between 
presidents, see generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: 
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH (1993); JAMES DAVID BARBER, THE 
PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER: PREDICTING PERFORMANCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE (1972). 
 169 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 460–61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961). 
 170 Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, 77 MD. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018). 
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takes truly seriously the notion of civic virtue and organizing our 
polity around it. That idea, associated with “civic republicanism,” 
was replaced by a much more “liberal” notion of politics that 
accepts the basic reality that all of us are motivated primarily by 
self-interest and unable (or, at least, unlikely) genuinely to tame 
those impulses in behalf of some evanescent idea of the “public 
interest” when the common good conflicts with our interests.171 
One can find strong hints of this view in Federalist No. 10, 
perhaps the most canonical of all of the eighty-five Federalist 
essays. Down that road lies the Holmesian “bad man,” who looks 
at law simply as a price system that announces the costs of legal 
non-compliance, which assumes, of course, that the law will in 
fact be enforced.172 From one perspective, Trump is simply the 
latest exemplar of the “bad man” who in effect now constitutes 
our political order. 
Recent events nevertheless suggest that, outside of 
Congress, other government officials are implicitly recognizing 
that Trump is not entitled to the same Article II prerogatives as 
presidents constitutionally fit for office. Military officials have 
not blindly followed presidential orders or have suggested they 
may refuse when they doubt presidential authority. Secretary of 
Defense James Mathis and other military leaders dragged their 
feet or flatly refused to implement Trump’s Twitter order 
banning transgendered patriots from serving in the armed 
forces.173 General John Hyten, the head of the U.S. Strategic 
Command, declared that he will not automatically obey a 
presidential order to use nuclear weapons.174 Lower federal 
courts have been unusually stingy with presidential authority. 
Within weeks of Trump’s taking office, Benjamin Wittes and 
 
 171 The seminal work on classical republicanism is JOHN GREVILLE AGARD POCOCK, 
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC 
REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975). For discussions of the differences between constitutional 
republicanism and constitutional liberalism, see Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 
YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE 
L.J. 1539 (1988). 
 172 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 
459 (1897). 
 173 See Travis J. Tritten, Coast Guard commandant signals he will resist Trump’s 
military transgender ban, WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.washington 
examiner.com/coast-guard-commandant-signals-he-will-resist-trumps-military-transgender- 
ban/article/2630294 [http://perma.cc/N4PV-UW8G]. 
 174 Daniella Diaz, Top general says he’d push back against “illegal” nuclear strike 
order, CNN (Nov. 20, 2017, 5:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/18/politics/air-force-
general-john-hyten-nuclear-strike-donald-trump/index.html [http://perma.cc/Q774-RNU6]. 
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Quinta Jurecic observed “a large number of judges around the 
country behav[ing] in a fashion untouched by deference or any 
kind of presumption of regularity in the President’s behavior[.]”175 
Federal courts have repeatedly found constitutional fault with 
Trump’s travel bans.176 Federal District Court Judge William 
Orrick recently granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the 
Trump Administration’s efforts from denying federal funding to 
sanctuary cities.177 Wittes and Jurecic suggest the “unprecedented 
barrage of leaks that has plagued the Trump administration” 
reflects common understandings that Trump is unfit for office.178 
“[W]hen the bureaucracy doubts the president’s oath,” they write, 
“that fact gravely frays the executive’s ordinary comparative unity. 
The people who work for the president no longer connect loyalty to 
the executive branch with the lofty goals to which the oath seeks 
to bind the president, so they become much more likely to act on 
their own.”179 No military officer, judge, or leaker has justified his 
or her actions by claiming that Trump lacks the executive powers 
of previous presidents.180 Nevertheless, the lack of deference to 
presidential authority that persons outside of Congress have 
demonstrated in Trump’s first year seems unprecedented. 
Perhaps we are wrong about Donald Trump. Perhaps we are 
wrong about whether constitutional powers are indifferent to the 
officeholder. We are not wrong in thinking that the political order 
in the United States is in a severe state of constitutional rot.181 
We hope with this paper to provoke specific constitutional 
conversations about the powers of an anti-Publian president, 
more general conversations about constitutional practice and 
interpretation during times of severe constitutional failures, and 
even more general conversations about whether the path to a 
more functional constitutional order lies in fixing our 
 
 175 Benjamin Wittes & Quinta Jurecic, What Happens When We Don’t Believe the 
President’s Oath, LAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-
happens-when-we-dont-believe-presidents-oath [http://perma.cc/YZ8T-F9FH]. 
 176 See supra notes 134–136 and accompanying text. 
 177 See Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d. 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 178 Wittes & Jurecic, supra note 175. 
 179 Id. Wittes and Jurecic further observe that when a “large number of people in the 
press cannot start with the presumption that the president is making a good faith effort 
to do his job . . . the press no longer presumes that any presidential statement is true.” Id. 
 180 Or, alas, cited a draft of this essay! 
 181 See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, U. MD. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 5–9, 11–13). 
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constitutional order through better interpretations of 
constitutional provisions, changes in the constitutional culture 
responsible for the anti-Publian president, or changes in the 
constitutional text that generated the anti-Publian president. 
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